

Japan's Perspective on the U.S.'s Extended Deterrence

(Congressional Commission on the U.S. Strategic Posture)

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I. Summary

- Japan needs, and will continue to need, the U.S.'s extended deterrence. (When Secretary Clinton was in Japan on Feb. 17th, FM Nakason requested her to reassure Japan of U.S.'s commitment to defend Japan, including its commitment to nuclear deterrence. In response, she did reassure him of such commitments. When PM Aso was in Washington on Feb. 24th, President Obama reassured PM of the U.S.'s commitment to the defense of Japan and extended deterrence, and stated its nuclear deterrence as the core of Japan-U.S. security arrangements)
- We think the U.S.'s deterrence capabilities should be (a) flexible, (b) credible, (c) prompt, (d) discriminating and selective, (e) stealthy/ demonstrate, and (f) sufficient to dissuade other from expanding or modernizing their nuclear capabilities.

II. Previous Comments at the October Meeting

1. Japan supports an ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. But the current security environment surrounding Japan requires U.S.'s deterrence, including its nuclear deterrence (as FM Nakasone confirmed to Secretary Clinton)
2. Japan relies on the US's extended deterrence as long as it is credible.
3. Deterrence is a combined effort between Japan and the U.S. Japan will contribute to the credibility of deterrence: For example, BMD, conventional warfare, ISR, and non-military operations (dissuasion and cost-imposing foreign policy etc.)
4. At the October meeting, one of the questions was "What specific capabilities in the U.S. does Japan think necessary?"

- It is difficult for us to specify the weapon systems which the U.S. should maintain or acquire. But we can list, though not exhaustively, several desired characteristics which the U.S. deterrence capabilities should have.

III. Additional Comments (Desired characteristics of U.S.'s deterrence capabilities)

1. Flexible Capabilities

- We understand that the current New Triad- (i) offensive strike forces (ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers and conventional precision guided missiles), (ii) ballistic

missile defense, and (iii) responsive infrastructure- gives the President the flexibility of options in responding to contingencies.

- The U.S.'s deterrence capabilities should be flexible enough to hold a wide variety of adversary threats at risk.
- “A wide variety of adversary threats” include”
 - deep and hardened underground facilities;
 - moveable targets;
 - cyber attacks, anti-satellite attack and;
 - anti-access/ area denial capabilities
- As for the question “Does Japan still need the TLAM/N (Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/ Nuclear)?”
 - We are not in a position to know details of this weapon system.
 - But it has been said that TLAM-N provides the flexibility of options (namely it is low yield, sea-based (stealthy), stand off (survivable) and can loiter).
 - If the U.S. decides to remove TLAM-N, we would like to be consulted well in advance on how the loss of this capability will be offset.

2. Credible Capabilities

- The U.S.'s deterrence capabilities should be so credible that potential adversaries' efforts to attack the U.S. and Japan are pointless in the first place.
- We understand aging nuclear weapons need to be addressed, and appreciate the US's continued efforts to maintain the credibility of nuclear warheads.
- Credible capabilities may require
 - credible nuclear warheads;
 - survivability after adversary's first attack
 - strong intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities;
 - Resilient and redundant (multiple) command & control networks

3. Prompt Capabilities

- The U.S.'s deterrence capabilities should be able to respond to contingencies promptly

4. Discriminating and selective Capabilities

- The U.S.'s deterrence capabilities should be able to discriminate and select intended targets only so that such attacks are accompanied with minimum collateral damage, if necessary.
- Such characteristics are important not only from a humanitarian perspective, but also because the U.S.'s deterrence should be effective and credible. If the U.S.'s attacks are always associated with massive civilian casualties, potential adversaries may not believe such attacks are credible.

5. Stealthy/ demonstrate Capabilities

- In some cases, the U.S. should be able to deploy or prepare its capabilities without being noticed by potential adversaries. (For example, the deployment of SSBNs and attack submarines in the region.)
- In other cases, the U.S. should be able to demonstrate its capabilities to express its strong will. (For example, the deployment of B-2s and B-52s to Guam.)

6. Sufficient Capabilities

- The quantity and quality of the U.S.'s deterrence capabilities should be sufficient enough for potential adversaries to be dissuaded from expanding or modernizing their own nuclear capabilities.
- As for the so-called "deep cuts" in the U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads, close consultations with Japan well in advance are essential.
- The US's possible unilateral reduction of its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads may have an adverse effect on Japan's security.
- When the U.S. engages in nuclear reduction talks with Russia, China's nuclear expansion and modernization should always be borne in mind. Japan should be consulted well in advance.

(End)